Should Israel hit Iran's nuclear facilities? - Page 3 - Mercedes-Benz Forum

View Poll Results: Should Israel hit Iran's nuclear facilities?
Yes, with our permission 5 17.24%
Yes, without our permission 16 55.17%
No, it is a violation of the international security and stability 3 10.34%
F*ck Iran and Israel 7 24.14%
Multiple Choice Poll. Voters: 29. You may not vote on this poll

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post #21 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:24 PM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by FeelTheLove
Story dated ONE YEAR AFTER THE INVASION. Please try again.

Post something pre March 18, 2003 claiming "Iraq has no WMDs"

If "everyone knew" someone must have said it, right?
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post #22 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:26 PM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by FeelTheLove
We have been over this a million times on this forum. Everyone here who has been here for a few years knows the facts. The IAEA stated flatly that Iraq had no active program for building nuclear weapons. Bush and Cheney and Rice said that he was. The UN Weapons said there was not. Here it is in Blix's own words, three weeks before Bush's mass murder of Iraqis on "Shock and Awe" day. Please eat your fucking words:

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middl...ings_2-14.html

Go buy a book, this is all history now. And are you drunk or something? The title and first paragraph of the article you posted suggests so:

Iraq dumped WMDs years ago, says Blix


No evidence to link Saddam with September 11 attacks, Bush admits

Oliver Burkeman in Washington
Thursday September 18, 2003
The Guardian


The former UN chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, believes that Iraq destroyed most of its weapons of mass destruction 10 years ago, according to an interview broadcast yesterday.
The claim came on the same day that President George Bush stated more bluntly than ever that there is no evidence to link Saddam Hussein to the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 - despite 69% of Americans believing Saddam had a personal role, according to a recent Washington Post opinion poll.
PBS link not working.

Blix made that statement SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE INVASION.

He never said "no WMDs" pre March 18, 2003.

Show us. Hindsight is not "everyone knew", FTL.
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post #23 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:35 PM
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You missed the first link from PBS. Read it. The CBS link is simply to report the quote on how Bush said the UN Weapons inspectors were "duped by Iraqi intelligence", which directly contradicts your argument that "everyone thought they had them" - if that was true, why was Bush saying they were "duped"? I'll tell you why: because they were telling the truth.
And your Google skills suck:

CNN SATURDAY MORNING NEWS

Fence-sitting Security Council Members Opposed to Deadline On Iraq

Aired March 8, 2003 - 09:01 ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

ANDERSON COOPER, CNN ANCHOR: Well, as you no doubt know, there is a flurry of diplomatic activity this weekend as the Bush administration tries to persuade fence-sitting Security Council members to impose a deadline on Iraq.
Here's what is expected in the days ahead. On Monday, Iraq may report to weapons inspectors on whether it destroyed its chemical and biological weapons in the 1990s. On Monday, or more likely Tuesday, the Security Council may vote on a new draft resolution which sets a March 17 deadline for Iraq to comply.

Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity to disarm if the council concludes Baghdad has not demonstrated full, unconditional, and immediate cooperation by Monday, March 17.

Let's get more on the diplomatic maneuvering as the Security Council prepares for that crucial vote.

Senior U.N. correspondent Richard Roth standing by at the U.N. -- Richard.

RICHARD ROTH, CNN SENIOR U.N. CORRESPONDENT: Anderson, this weekend probably represents the calm before yet another diplomatic storm here at the United Nations. Monday afternoon, 4:00 East Coast time, is when the next round of consultations will begin, and that may be the last session before the U.S. expects to call for some sort of vote on the latest resolution introduced on Iraq.

The changes made on Friday put a deadline on Iraq to cooperate, turn over all weapons of mass destruction. The new deadline date, St. Patrick's Day, March 17, which is a Monday.

The United States' ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, last evening told the Security Council that the U.S. may call for a vote as early as Tuesday.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

JOHN NEGROPONTE, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS: A resolution is in absolutely final form only when it's put to a vote. So one should never say never to the possibility of changes. But we've been quite clear all along that we would insist on voting on a resolution that contains the substance that this draft does, which is to have the council decide that Iraq is not complying, it is out of compliance with Resolution 1441.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ROTH: There's a lot of interesting sidelight stories, of course, in all of the debate yesterday. I mean, inside the Security Council chamber, the French delegate, during the last evening consultation, said and complained of a hidden veto in the now-U.S.-amended resolution.

Spain's ambassador said, quote, "I don't like the veto either. I'm an enemy of the veto." But after listening to the French foreign minister earlier in the day, he said, "I wonder, with one veto the U.S. has suddenly called stinking and reactionary, while, when France wants to use the veto, it is pure religion and idealism."

Other uncommitted members, though, still are skeptical of this U.S. draft. They don't think it gives enough time to Iraq to comply, Anderson.

COOPER: Richard, there's also some reports this morning about possible forged documents, you know, the -- about Iraq attempting to obtain uranium. Do you know anything about that?

ROTH: Well, the International Atomic Energy Agency director, Mohamed ElBaradei, said and implied that documents were forged, which indicates that Iraq was trying to obtain enriched uranium through Niger, an African country, again, calling into question the veracity of U.S. intelligence claims on a lot of fronts.


Once again, inspectors challenging these reports, as Hans Blix did in saying that his inspectors have not been duped and Iraq is not moving weapons of mass destruction just minutes before the inspection teams get there.

So for many council members here, the U.S. may have to put up more intelligence information in order to convince them that Iraq is a threat and is avoiding the resolutions.

COOPER: All right. Richard, that's obviously a story we will be following throughout the day. Richard Roth at the U.N. Thanks very much.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

-President Barack Obama, 1st Inaugural address
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post #24 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:39 PM
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PBS:

BACKGROUND REPORT:
CHIEF INSPECTOR

February 13, 2003


U.N. chief inspectors Hans Blix and Mohammed ElBaradei are preparing for tomorrow's report to the U.N. Security Council. Spencer Michels reports on Blix's history and his role in the confrontation with Iraq.
Follow-Up Discussion


SPENCER MICHELS: Hans Blix is said to have taken the weapons inspector job reluctantly three years ago. In fact, the man who's now 74 had already begun his retirement when the U.N. asked him to head its Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC. Blix was a compromise candidate before the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. and Britain had pushed for Rolf Ekeus, who was considered tougher, but France, Russia and China opposed him.
RICHARD HOLBROOKE: We have further discussed a number of other candidates and found consensus on only one: Hans Blix of Sweden, another very distinguished international civil servant, whose career most notably included leadership of IAEA in Vienna.

SPENCER MICHELS: Blix began his career as a lawyer, and served in Sweden's foreign service for two decades, including the post of foreign minister in 1978. From 1981 to 1997, Blix headed the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA monitors compliance with the nuclear non- proliferation treaty. Blix took the job at UNMOVIC, created specifically to disarm Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, in January 2000. While at the IAEA, Blix oversaw inspections of nuclear power plants in North Korea and South Africa, as well as Iraq. But during his watch in the 80s, the agency did not detect Baghdad's nuclear weapons program until the Gulf War ended in 1991. Mohamed ElBaradei succeeded Blix as IAEA director general. The new round of Iraqi inspections began in November. A month later, Blix resisted U.S. requests that he move aggressively to take Iraqi scientists out of the country for interviews.

HANS BLIX: And I have said that we are not going to abduct anybody, and we are not serving as a defection agency.

SPENCER MICHELS: Blix has also distanced himself from American rhetoric against Iraq.

REPORTER: Pres. Bush continuously accuses Baghdad of playing hide and seek. Does UNMOVIC share the same sentiments?

HANS BLIX: Well, I don't want to express myself in those words. But, as you realize, there are things that have gone well, like the access, prompt access, like setting up of the infrastructure, where the Iraqis have been helpful.
But there are other areas where we are not satisfied.

SPENCER MICHELS: In the days before his January report to the U.N., Blix denied that his inspections would end any time soon.

HANS BLIX: Well, we are not the ones who have established the 27th of January as the end of history. We were asked in that resolution to update the Council. Update is not a final report, it's an updating about what has happened and what have you learned in these two months, and that's what we're going to do. And we can see a lot of work ahead of us, beyond that date, if we are allowed to do so.

SPENCER MICHELS: A few days later, at the Security Council, Blix noted several problems with Baghdad's compliance.

HANS BLIX: Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace. Last weekend, when he returned to Baghdad, Blix said Iraq was starting to heed the mounting international criticism.

HANS BLIX: They gave is some papers which analyzed and gave some further information and we had some discussions with the scientists and that's why when they talk about a beginning I have not seen this before and I think that was hopeful. We are not at all at the end of the road.

SPENCER MICHELS: This week a reporter asked Blix whether his report tomorrow represents D-day for his mission. Blix said "no, there are many days. Friday is an important day."


http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middl...blix_2-13.html

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

-President Barack Obama, 1st Inaugural address
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Lest we forget, Blix doesn't run the UN, the Security Council does

2003

Iraq failed to deliver on it's agreements at the cessation of hostilities in 1991. Subsequent to that, the UN passed a number of resolutions directly targeting Iraq, at least a dozen of which detailed non-compliance. In Dec of 1992 Iraq was given one final opportunity to detail what had become of their NBC research, development, and deployment. By UN resolution, Iraq was found not to have complied. Noncompliance under these resolution directly allowed for the use of force by the designated entity responsible for military operations.

There was no need for yet another vote. It was redundant and yet another dishonest ploy by France's de Villepin, whose friends had benefited from "Oil For Food" bribes by Saddam, lest we forget.

Bot

1518 (24 November 2003)
Establishes a committee (the 1518 committee) to identify resources which should be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq. This replaced some of the post-sanctions work of the '661 committee', which officially ceased to exist on 22 November 2003
Adopts guidelines on the interpretation of resolution 1483's requirements for transfer of resources to the Development Fund for Iraq. The guidelines have been published as SC/7791 IK/356 (12 June 2003) and SC/7831 IK/372 (29 July 2003).
1511 (16 October 2003) (pdf version)
This resolution:
mandates the UN to 'strengthen its vital role in Iraq' (para 8)
'underscores...the temporary nature of the Coalition Provisional Authority' (para 1), welcomes the Governing Council and its ministers as "the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration" (para 4), and supports moves towards self-government under its auspices(para 3)
invites the Governing Council to draw up, by 15 December, a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding elections, in cooperation with, and assisted by, the CPA and the UN representative (para 7 & 8). Requests the CPA to report to the Security Council on progress towards the transfer of power (para 6)
authorises a multinational security force, and urges states to contribute to it and to the reconstruction of Iraq (para 13 & 14). Requests states to contribute financially (para 20), including at a Donors Conference (para 21), by providing required resources (para 22) and by transferring assets of the former regime to the Development Fund for Iraq (para 24)
Requests the Secretary General to report on UN operations in Iraq (para 12). Requests the US to report, at least every 6 months, on military matters (para 25). Decides that the Security Council should review the mission of the UN force within a year, and that its mandate will expire once power has been transferred to an Iraqi government (para 15)
Reiterates the demand made in Resolution 1483 for an International Advisory and Monitoring Board to supervise administration of the Development Fund for Iraq (para 23)
Three earlier US drafts for this resolution were made public, on 4 September, 1 October and 13 October 2003. Postings to the CASI discussion list summarise differences between the first and second drafts, and between the second and third drafts. Amendments to the first draft were publicly proposed by France and Germany, and by Syria. Several of the Franco-German proposals were incorporated into the resolution.
1500 (14 August 2003)
Establishes UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, as proposed by the Secretary General in a report on July 17
Welcomes creation of Governing Council
1490 (3 July 2003)
Disbands the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), and removes the demilitarised zone betweeen Iraq and Kuwait. Comes into force on 6 October 2003.
1483 (22 May 2003)
Lifts non-military sanctions (para 10)
Recognises Britain and the United States as occupying powers ('The Authority'), and calls on them to attempt to improve security and stability, and provide opportunities for the Iraqis to determine their political future. Creates position of UN Special Representative to Iraq, to coordinate UN activity. Requires establishment of Development Fund for Iraq
Summaries and analysis can be found on pages 10-13 of the Open Society Institute paper "Reconstructing Iraq: a guide to the issues", and in this article from the American Society of International Law. A Parliamentary research paper (2 June 2003) provides a British government perspective.
Initial US-UK draft (9 May)
Revised US-UK-Spain draft (15 May)
The Open Society Institute criticized aspects of this resolution, and suggested changes to allow greater supervision of the occupying powers
1476 (24 April 2003)
1472 (28 March 2003)
Gives UN more authority to administer the "oil for food" programme for the next 45 days. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish alternative locations for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and equipment, and proceed with approved contracts after a review to determine priorities. Other steps called for include: transferring unencumbered funds between accounts created pursuant to the programme on an exceptional and reimbursable basis to ensure the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies; and using funds deposited in the accounts to compensate suppliers and shippers for agreed additional shipping, transportation and storage costs incurred as a result of diverting and delaying shipments
Resolution proposed by Spain, the US and the UK, which would have authorized military action against Iraq (7 March 2003)
Comments of Kofi Annan on 10 March, 11 March and 17 March
Joint statement by France, Russia and Germany in opposition to a UN resolution authorizing force
Statements by France and Germany (19 March)
2002

1454 (30 December 2002): Iraq-Kuwait
implements revisions to the Goods Review List. See also the accompanying UN press release.
1447 (4 December 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends the oil-for-food programme by 6 months, obliges the council to review the goods review list within one month and asks the Secretary General to produce a report on the adequacy of Iraq's distribution mechamisms within the country and oil-for-food revenues within six months. See the accompanying press release.
1443 (25 November 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends the oil-for-food programme by 9 days only, due to disagreements over US proposals to broaden the Goods Review List. See the accompanying UN press release. See also CASI's press release on the politicisation of the oil-for-food programme.
1441 (8 November 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.
Earlier drafts of this resolution are as follows: the US/UK drafts of 2 October 2002, 25 October 2002 and 5 November 2002; the Russian draft and the French draft of 23 October 2002. A collections of critical comments on the resolution can be found on the websites of the Institute for Public Accuracy and Eclipse review.
Post-vote statements by the US, UK, France, Russia and China are available from the Global Policy Forum
1409 (14 May 2002): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends the oil-for-food programme by six months, and introduces a new import procedure. Only items on the annexed Goods Review List (GRL) are to be reviewed by the Sanctions Committee. Official version of the GRL (S/2002/515) are here (on the Unmovic site) and here (on the OIP site). Although the GRL is annexed to a letter from the US ambassador dated 3 May 2002 - before the resolution was even offically passed - it was only released on 14 August 2002. An unofficial version of the "Goods Review List" is also available on the UN Office of the Iraq programme website, in doc (2.2MB) and pdf versions (4.6MB). Some background is provided in the UN Press Release and a News Centre report. See also CASI's press release in response to the resolution (15 May 2002); Statement by Save the Children UK (May 2002); Statements by CAFOD of 16 May 2002 and 27 June 2002; and the analyses of Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctions Renewed on Iraq (14 May 2002), and Colin Rowat, Iraq Sanctions Saga Continues amid Policy Confusion (10 June 2002). See also the fact sheet from the United States mission to the UN on the "Goods Review List" (14 May 2002).
2001
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1382 (29 November 2001): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends the oil-for-food programme by 180 days, commencing Phase XI on 1 December 2001. It also adopts a new "goods review list" (GRL) and procedures for its application to come into force on 30 May 2002. Note that the GRL consists not only of the items actually listed in the annex to the resolution, but also those on the "1051 lists" and those listed within a new 150-page list drawn up by the US. This latter list was an annex to a letter from the US ambassador dated 27 November 2001; a copy sent to CASI can be viewed here. All applications to import goods will have to be reviewed by Unmovic and the UN Office of the Iraq Programme to determine if the proposed imports contain items on the GRL.
1360 (3 July 2001): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends the oil-for-food programme by 150 days to begin Phase X, after no agreement was reached over the new UK proposals for a modified sanctions regime. The subsequent exchange of letters between the UN and Iraq, agreeing to the continuation of the programme under the terms of this resolution, is dated 5 July 2001. The text of the Security Council debates are available for 26 June 2001 and 28 June 2001. CASI's full index of proposals and statements from May to July 2001 is available here.
1352 (1 June 2001): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends Phase IX of the oil-for-food programme by one month only, after there is general agreement that more time is necessary to review the UK's draft resolution (and annex) to change the scope and mode of operation of the sanctions.
2000

1330 (4 December 2000): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends the oil-for-food programme by 180 days, to commence Phase IX. The resolution also allocates another $600m to oil-industry spares, requests exploration into a "cash component" (para. 15), reduces Compensation Fund deductions to 25% (para 12), requests electricity and housing "green lists" (para 10), expresses "readiness to consider" paying Iraq's UN membership dues out of oil-for-food revenue, seeks expanded versions of the existing "green lists" (para 11), and asks the Secretary-General to report on other oil export routes from Iraq. UN Press Release here.
1302 (8 June 2000): Iraq-Kuwait.
Begins Phase VIII of "oil for food". The UN's press release is here. Paragraph 8 asks for water and sanitation "green lists". Paragraph 9 extends the oil spare parts permission of SCR 1293. Paragraph 18 calls for the establishment of a team of "independent experts to prepare by 26 November 2000 a comprehensive report and analysis of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, including the current humanitarian needs [...] and recommendations to meet those needs, within the framework of the existing resolutions". According to a UN source, the UK and US insisted upon the final clause of paragraph 18, knowing that the Iraqi government's position would prevent it from cooperating with such an analysis. As a result, there has been no cooperation and no such report has been produced. The BBC's report outlines the politics behind the comprehensive report. AP's report concentrates on the debate around bombing in the "no fly zones". On 30 October, the chair of the group of independent experts mentioned in the resolution was announced as Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway.

1293 (31 March 2000): Iraq-Kuwait.
Doubles permitted oil spare part imports for Phases VI and VII. The UN's press release is here. Paragraphs 53 - 57 of the UN Secretary-General's 10 March 2000 report (S/2000/208) explains the background to this doubling. See CNN's story for mention of some of the politics of the resolution.
1999

1284 (17 December 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.
Replaces Unscom with Unmovic, demands Iraqi co-operation on prisoners of war, alters the "oil for food" programme, and discusses the possible suspension of sanctions in ambiguous terms. The statement by Sir Jeremy Greenstock in the Security Council at the introduction of the resolution is here; the full debates in the Council are here; and the UN's press release is here. The UK draft resolution preceding this is here. See also CASI's briefing or its press release.
1281 (10 December 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.
Begins Phase VII of "oil for food", to start on 12 December 1999. The report requested in paragraph 9 is S/2000/26. Listen to the BBC's radio story, including an explanation that the previous week-long extensions may have been too short to allow Iraq to sign oil contracts.
1280 (3 December 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends Phase VI to 11 December 1999 due to wrangling over SCR 1284.
1275 (19 November 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.
Extends Phase VI to 4 December 1999 due to wrangling over SCR 1284.
1266 (4 October 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.
Allows an additional $3.04 billion in oil sales to offset deficits during previous Phases and (possibly) to slow the rise in oil prices.
1242 (21 May 1999): Iraq-Kuwait.
Begins Phase VI of "oil for food", to start on 25 May 1999.
1998

1210 (24 November 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
Begins Phase V of "oil for food", to start on 26 November 1998.
1205 (5 November 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
Echoes SCR 1194, demands that the Iraqi government "provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with inspectors and alludes to the threat to "international peace and security" posed by the non-cooperation.
1194 (9 September 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
"Condemns the decision by Iraq ... to suspend cooperation with [Unscom] and the IAEA", demands that the decisions be reversed and cancels October 1998 scheduled sanctions review.
1175 (19 June 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
Gives Iraq permission to apply to import up to $300 million of oil industry spare parts this Phase to allow it to increase its oil production to the cap set in SCR 1153.
1158 (25 March 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
Continues Phase III but under the enhanced provisions of SCR 1153.
1154 (2 March 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
Commends the Secretary-General for securing commitments from the Iraqi government to fully comply with weapons inspections on his mission to Baghdad, and endorses the memorandum of understanding (S/1998/166) that was signed on 23 February. The mapping of the areas of the eight "presidential sites" by a UN Technical Mission is described in an annexed report to a letter from the Secretary-General of 27 February (S/1998/166/Add.1). The procedures for the inspection of "presidential sites" are laid out in an annex to the letter from the Secretary-General of 8 March 1998 (S/1998/208). This agreement put off US and British bombing threats.
1153 (20 February 1998): Iraq-Kuwait.
Agrees to increase the cap on permitted Iraqi oil sales to $5.256 billion per Phase once the Secretary-General has approved an "enhanced distribution plan" for the new revenue. Recognises the importance of infrastructure and project-based purchases. Phase IV eventually begins on 30 May 1998. Resolution passed during Unscom crisis.
1997

1143 (4 December 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.
Begins Phase III of "oil for food", to start on 5 December 1997 and welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to submit a supplementary report on possible improvements in the "oil for food" programme.
1137 (12 November 1997): Iraq-Kuwait
Rejects Iraqi government's announced intention to prohibit weapons inspections unless the composition of Unscom teams is altered to limit the number of inspectors from the US, and to prohibit Unscom overflights. Imposes travel ban on officials to be lifted when full cooperation resumes. Sanctions review to be in April 1998 if cooperation has been restored.
1134 (23 October 1997): Iraq-Kuwait
Reaffirms Iraq's obligations to cooperate with weapons inspectors after Iraqi officials announce in September 1997 that "presidential sites" are off-limits to inspectors. Threatens travel ban on obstructive Iraqi officials not "carrying out bona fide diplomatic assignments or missions" if non-cooperation continues. Sanctions reviews again delayed.
1129 (12 September 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.
Alters timing of permitted Phase II oil sales in response to Iraqi government's refusal to sell oil until its Distribution Plan was approved by the UN.
1115 (21 June 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.
"Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites" and "[d]emands that [they] cooperate fully" with Unscom. Suspends the sanctions and arms embargo reviews (paragraphs 21 and 28 of SCR 687) until the next Unscom report and threatens to "impose additional measures on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance".
1111 (4 June 1997): Iraq-Kuwait.
Begins Phase II of "oil for food", to start on 8 June 1997.
1996
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1060 (12 June 1996): Iraq.
On Iraq's refusal to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission.
1051 (27 March 1996): Iraq.
Establishes mechanism for long-term monitoring of potentially "dual use" Iraqi imports and exports, as called for by SCR 715.
1995

986 (14 April 1995): Iraq
New "oil for food" resolution, allowing $1 billion in oil sales every 90 days. Memorandum of understanding signed by UN and Government of Iraq on 20 May 1996; Phase I begins on 10 December 1996. The details of implementation, requested in paragraph 12, are here.
1994

949 (15 October 1994): Iraq-Kuwait.
"Condemns recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of ... Kuwait", demands an immediate withdrawal and full co-operation with Unscom. According to a spokesman for the US Central Command, the resolution was passed following a threatening buildup of Iraqi forces near the border with Kuwait, and bars Iraq from moving SAMs into the southern no-fly zone.
899 (4 March 1994): Iraq-Kuwait.
Allows compensation to private Iraqi citizens who lost assets to the boundary demarcation process.
1993

833 (27 May 1993): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
"Welcomes ... the successful conclusion of the work of the [Boundary Demarcation] Commission". The Iraqi National Assembly recognised the territorial integrity and political independence of the State of Kuwait, within the boundaries laid down by the Boundary Demarcation Commission, on 10 November 1994, and its decision was ratified in a decree signed by Saddam Hussein on the same day.
806 (5 February 1993): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Arms UNIKOM to prevent border incursions by Iraq.
1992

778 (2 October 1992): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Deplores Iraq's refusal to implements SCRs 706 and 712 and recalls Iraq's liabilities. Takes steps to transfer funds (including Iraqi assets overseas) into the UN account established to pay for compensation and humanitarian expenses.
773 (26 August 1992): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Responds to a report on progress by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and notes that the Commission "is not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq".
1991

715 (11 October 1991): Iraq (PDF).
Approves the plans of Unscom and the IAEA, including for long term monitoring. Iraq agreed to the monitoring system established by this resolution on 26 November 1993.
712 (19 September 1991): Iraq (PDF).
Rejects the Secretary-General's suggestion that at least $2 billion in oil revenue be made available for humanitarian needs; instead allows total sale of $1.6 billion. Eventually rejected by Government of Iraq.
707 (15 August 1991): Iraq (PDF).
Condemns Iraq's non-compliance on weapons inspections as a "material breach" of Resolution 687, and incorporates into its standard for compliance with SCR687 that Iraq provide "full, final and complete disclosure ... of all aspects of its programmes to develop" prohibited weaponry. Also grants permission for Unscom and the IAEA to conduct flights throughout Iraq, for surveillance or logistical purposes.
706 (15 August 1991): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Decides to allow emergency oil sale by Iraq to fund compensation claims, weapons inspection and humanitarian needs in Iraq. The text of the debates on this resolution in the Security Council is available here.
705 (15 August 1991): Iraq (PDF).
"Decides that ... compensation to be paid by Iraq ... shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports".
700 (17 June 1991): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Approves the Secretary-General's guidelines on an arms and dual-use embargo on Iraq and calls upon states to act consistently with them. Paragraph 5 of this resolution makes the 661 committee responsible for the on-going monitoring regime, thus ensuring that it would retain a role in the long-term relationship between the UN and Iraq.
699 (17 June 1991): Iraq (PDF).
Approves the Secretary-General's plan for Unscom and the IAEA and asks for support from Member States.
692 (20 May 1991): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Establishes the UN Compensation Commission and asks the Secretary-General to indicate the maximum possible level of Iraq's contribution to the Compensation Fund.
689 (9 April 1991): Iraq-Kuwait (PDF).
Approves the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).
688 (5 April 1991): Iraq (PDF).
"Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population" in the post-war civil war and "[d]emands that Iraq ... immediately end this repression". 688 is occasionally claimed to provide the legal basis for the American and British "no fly zones". These claims are incorrect both because 688 does not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a necessary condition for the use of force, and because it does not authorise specific measures to uphold human rights in Iraq, such as "no fly zones". The BBC has an outline of the "no fly zones" here. The UK Select Committee on Defence addresses the legal issue briefly here.

Details:
RESOLUTION 686 (1991)
(d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in adjacent waters;

RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,

Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,

Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,
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post #28 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:45 PM
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How about the ME, North Africa or any Asian Muslim country?
Based upon those criteria:

Israel, Egypt, Turkey, UAR (Dubai), Malaysia, and Morrocco (admittedly for a VERY short stay).

I lived in Spain for 6 months and in England for 6 months. Spent 2 months in Greece.

2 Months in Central America.

Plus dozens of countries visited in Western and Eastern Europe.

Bottom line: More travel and international experinece that the vast majority of condescending elitist liberals who ask questions like,"Have you ever been outside of the United States."

I usually answer in Spanish.

So have you spent a lot of time in a Madrasah with Salafists?
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post #29 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:50 PM
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Botnst, you say that 2003

"Iraq failed to deliver on it's agreements at the cessation of hostilities in 1991. Subsequent to that, the UN passed a number of resolutions directly targeting Iraq, at least a dozen of which detailed non-compliance. In Dec of 1992 Iraq was given one final opportunity to detail what had become of their NBC research, development, and deployment. By UN resolution, Iraq was found not to have complied. Noncompliance under these resolution directly allowed for the use of force by the designated entity responsible for military operations."

Since they had no WMDs, how did they fail to comply? You should write for Pravada, circa 1960. You do not make any sense.

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

-President Barack Obama, 1st Inaugural address
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post #30 of 119 (permalink) Old 12-07-2006, 05:51 PM
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Botnst, you say that 2003

"Iraq failed to deliver on it's agreements at the cessation of hostilities in 1991. Subsequent to that, the UN passed a number of resolutions directly targeting Iraq, at least a dozen of which detailed non-compliance. In Dec of 1992 Iraq was given one final opportunity to detail what had become of their NBC research, development, and deployment. By UN resolution, Iraq was found not to have complied. Noncompliance under these resolution directly allowed for the use of force by the designated entity responsible for military operations."

Since they had no WMDs, how did they fail to comply? You should write for Pravada, circa 1960. You do not make any sense.
For goodness sakes, don't take my word for it. Read the UN resolution that addresses that very issue.

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