Originally Posted by GermanStar
Of course it does, but at the same time, I am struck by the possibility that Iran might be our strongest ally in the region today had we not meddled in their internal affairs back in the '50s. We seem to have a way of creating our own messes.
Even with hindsight being 20/20, to support Mossadegh and try to negotiate a less radical way to Nationalize Irans energy sector would have just been common sense. The US used to be Irans Friend after President Truman forced both the British and the Russians troops out. They had already divided Iran into spheres of influence. Inside Iran, the Russians had even established the peoples Republic of Azerbeijan and the Republic of Kurdestan.
For a bit of history: At the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Tehran Declaration guaranteed the post-war independence and boundaries of Iran. However when the war actually ended, Soviet troops stationed in northwestern Iran not only refused to withdraw but backed revolts that established short-lived, pro-Soviet separatist national states in the northern regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the People's Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kurdistan in late 1945, both effective Soviet puppet regimes.
Soviet troops did not withdraw from Iran proper until May 1946 after receiving a promise of oil concessions. The Soviet republics in the north were soon overthrown and the oil concessions were revoked.
 United States and the Shah
Soldiers surround the Parliament building in Tehran on August 19, 1953.Initially there were hopes that post-occupation Iran could become a constitutional monarchy. The new, young Shah Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi initially took a very hands-off role in government, and allowed parliament to hold a lot of power. Some elections were held in the first shaky years, although they remained mired in corruption. Parliament became chronically unstable, and from the 1947 to 1951 period Iran saw the rise and fall of six different prime ministers.
In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, a nationalist, received the vote required from the parliament to nationalize the British-owned oil industry, in a situation known as the Abadan Crisis. Despite British pressure, including an economic blockade which caused real hardship, the nationalization continued. Mossadegh was briefly removed from power in 1952 but was quickly re-appointed by the shah, due to an overwhelming majority in parliament supporting him, and he, in turn, forced the Shah into a brief exile in August of 1953. A military coup headed by his former minister of the Interior and retired army general Fazlollah Zahedi, with the support of the intelligence services of the British and US governments, finally forced Mossadegh from office on August 19. Mossadegh was arrested and tried for treason by a military tribunal, while Zahedi succeeded him as prime minister.
In return for the US support the Shah agreed, in 1954, to allow an international consortium of British (40%), American (40%), French (6%), and Dutch (14%) companies to run the Iranian oil facilities for the next 25 years, with profits shared equally. The international consortium agreed to a fifty-fifty split of profits with Iran but would not allow Iran to audit their accounts to confirm the consortium was reporting profits properly, nor would they allow Iran to have members on their board of directors. There was a return to stability in the late 1950s and the 1960s. In 1957 martial law was ended after 16 years and Iran became closer to the West, joining the Baghdad Pact and receiving military and economic aid from the US. The Iranian government began a broad program of reforms to modernize the country, notably changing the quasi-feudal land system