Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document? - Page 2 - Mercedes-Benz Forum

Reply
 
LinkBack Thread Tools Display Modes
post #11 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 05:06 PM
guage
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Mentioned: Post(s)
Quoted: Post(s)
Yellow Cake -Uranium. Where? Only 500 tons

Carl Limbacher and NewsMax.com

No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq? Not Exactly ...

Is it really true that Saddam Hussein had no "stockpiles" of weapons of mass destruction before the U.S. invaded in March 2003?

Not exactly - at least not if one counts the 500 tons of uranium that the Iraqi dictator kept stored at his al Tuwaitha nuclear weapons development plant.

The press hasn't made much of Saddam's 500-ton uranium stockpile, downplaying the story to such an extent that most Americans aren't even aware of it.
But it's been reported - albeit in a by-the-way fashion - by the New York Times and a handful of other media outlets. And one of Saddam's nuclear scientists, Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, admitted to the BBC earlier this year, "We had 500 tons of yellow cake [uranium] in Baghdad."

Surely 500 tons of anything qualifies as a "stockpile." And press reports going back more than a decade give no indication that weapons inspectors had any idea the Iraqi dictator had amassed such a staggering amount of nuke fuel until the U.S. invaded.

That's when the International Atomic Energy Agency was finally able to take a full inventory, and suddenly the 500-ton figure emerged.

Still, experts say Saddam's massive uranium stockpile was largely benign.

Largely? Well, except for the 1.8 tons of uranium that Saddam had begun to enrich. The U.S. Energy Department considered that stockpile so dangerous that it mounted an unprecedented airlift operation four months ago to remove the enriched uranium stash from al Tuwaitha.

But didn't most of that enrichment take place before the first Gulf War - with no indication whatsoever that Saddam was capable of proceeding any further toward his dream of acquiring the bomb?

That seems to be the consensus. But there's also disturbing evidence to the contrary.

David Kay, the former chief U.S. weapons inspector who was hailed by the press last year for pronouncing Iraq WMD-free, shared some interesting observations with Congress this past January about goings-on at al Tuwaitha in 2000 and 2001.

"[The Iraqis] started building new buildings, renovating it, hiring some new staff and bringing them together," Kay said. "And they ran a few physics experiments, re-ran experiments they'd actually run in the '80s."

"Fortunately, from my point of view," he added, "Operation Iraqi Freedom intervened and we don't know how or how fast that would have gone ahead. ... Given their history, it was certainly an emerging program that I would not have looked forward to their continuing to pursue."

Kay's successor, Charles Duelfer, also has confirmed that nuclear research at al Tuwaitha was continuing right up until the U.S. invasion, telling Congress in March that Saddam's scientists were "preserving and expanding [their] knowledge to design and develop nuclear weapons."

One laboratory at al Tuwaitha, Duelfer said, "was intentionally focused on research applicable for nuclear weapons development."

Still, most experts say that Iraq was nowhere near being able to produce nuclear weapons, which is a good thing, considering how much raw material Saddam had to work with.

Writing in the London Evening Standard earlier this year, Norman Dombey, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Sussex, walked his readers through a simple calculation:

"You have a warehouse containing 500 tons of natural uranium; you need 25 kilograms of U235 to build one weapon. How many nuclear weapons can you build? The answer is 142."

Fortunately for the world, Saddam didn't have the nuclear enrichment technology to convert his 500-ton uranium stockpile into weapons-grade bombmaking material.

Or did he?

After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad last year, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program until 1997, had some disturbing news for coalition debriefers.

He kept blueprints for a nuclear centrifuge, along with some actual centrifuge components, stored at his home - buried in the front yard - awaiting orders from Baghdad to proceed.

"I had to maintain the program to the bitter end," Obeidi said recently. His only other choice was death.

In his new book, "The Bomb in My Garden," the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted Saddam's bombmaking program.

"The centrifuge is the single most dangerous piece of nuclear technology," he writes. "With advances in centrifuge technology, it is now possible to conceal a uranium enrichment program inside a single warehouse."

Last week Dr. Obeidi warned in a New York Times op-ed piece that Saddam could have restarted his nuclear program "with a snap of his fingers."

Perhaps the 500-ton stockpile of nuclear fuel that Saddam kept at al Tuwaitha wasn't quite as benign as our media like to pretend.

Sponsored Links
Advertisement
 
post #12 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 06:38 PM
BenzWorld Member
 
Date registered: Sep 2005
Location: Atlanta
Posts: 308
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 0 Post(s)
Send a message via AIM to Ammonium
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

Carl Limbacher is hardly someone without bias. You make yourself look foolish by posting material off of such a rightwing fascists website.
Ammonium is offline  
post #13 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 06:42 PM
guage
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Mentioned: Post(s)
Quoted: Post(s)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

foolish by posting material off of such a rightwing fascists website
I know, you like the non-bias Wash Post or NY Times

Are you say'n it was not their?

post #14 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 07:07 PM
BenzWorld Member
 
Date registered: Sep 2005
Location: Atlanta
Posts: 308
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 0 Post(s)
Send a message via AIM to Ammonium
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

Since you're going to insist on it, why not have some material to backup your claims? Everyone likes sources these days.
Ammonium is offline  
post #15 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 07:34 PM
BenzWorld Elite
 
Date registered: Sep 2004
Vehicle: 95 E300
Location: Inside my head
Posts: 36,850
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 392 Post(s)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

Quote:
Ammonium - 11/1/2005 9:07 PM

Since you're going to insist on it, why not have some material to backup your claims? Everyone likes sources these days.
Here ya go Kirk, I mean Ammonium. Enjoy.

Bot


-------------------------

Nuclear Chronology

1992-2002



This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.



Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.



12 January 1992
IAEA officials accuse Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials of failing to declare large quantities of materials and components Iraq had obtained for its gas centrifuge program.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Shop-till-you-drop Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/a92/a92.albright.html>.



13 January 1992
Iraq acknowledges that it had imported German materials and components and had acquired 100 tons of maraging steel and other raw materials needed to manufacture centrifuge components.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Shop-till-you-drop Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/a92/a92.albright.html>; UN Security Council, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>, p. 80.



Week of 24 February 1992
Eight managers from three German firms (H & H Metalform GmbH, Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau GmbH & Co KG, and Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik GmbH) are arrested and suspected of aiding Iraq's clandestine nuclear and non-conventional weapons program. IAEA inspectors find equipment from all three companies at various clandestine sites in Iraq. [Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau supplied the State Electrical Industries Establishment in Baghdad with 240,000 dual-use ferritic spacer magnets for the motor stators of gas centrifuges. Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik is named as the manufacturer of computer-numerically-controlled (CNC) machines which are equipped with fixtures and program to manufacture centrifuge parts. H & H supplied the Iraqis with numerous flow-forming machines for cold-pressing thick metal cylinders into thin-walled tubes.]
—Mark Hibbs, "Eight German Executives Arrested on Dual-Use Exports to Iraq," Nuclear Fuel, 2 March 1992, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



April 1992
A group of nuclear weapons designers from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia meet to assess the progress of Iraq's nuclear program before the Persian Gulf War, based on documents obtained through subsequent IAEA inspections. These designers conclude that bottlenecks in the program could have delayed completion of a working bomb for at least three years, assuming Iraq had continued its multifaceted strategy and design approach.
—"Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>.



April 1992
Iraq reluctantly allows the destruction of Al Atheer and the adjacent Al Hatteen high-explosive test establishment after the IAEA reveals two Iraqi documents that disclose plans to develop a nuclear explosive device at Al Atheer. The decision to destroy Al Atheer's main buildings means that even if Iraq later acquires or purchases fissile materials, it would lack a site where they could be fabricated into weapons.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq: It's All Over at Al Atheer," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1992, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/j92/j92.reports.html>; David Albright and Robert Kelley, "Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/nd95/nd95.albright.html>.



14-21 July 1992
The destruction of the Al Tarmiya and Al Sharqat facilities is completed.
—UN Security Council, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>, p. 63.



February 1993
The IAEA and the AEC sign a memorandum of understanding on the removal of the spent fuel inventory from Iraq's research reactors at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.
—"Iraq," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



8 October 1993
Iraq gives chief UN Weapons Inspector Rolf Ekeus a list of foreign suppliers that assisted its nuclear weapons program.
—"Iraq Owns up to Weapons Suppliers," Press Association, 8 October 1993, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



6 December 1993
The first consignment of Iraq's irradiated fuel is flown to Russia for disposal.
—"First Consignment of Irradiated Fuel Flown to Russia," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 December 1993, cited in
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



February 1994
The IAEA completes the removal of all weapon-usable nuclear material (primarily research reactor fuel) under IAEA safeguards.
—"IAEA and Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/iaea.htm>.



August 1994
Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, former director of Iraq's nuclear weapons programs, defects to the West. In response to his defection, Iraq provides an official explanation that Hamza retired from the nuclear program in 1990, entered in the food business, and became a millionaire.
—Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 13; Mark Hibbs, "Suspected Informer Was Physicist in Iraq's Uranium Enrichment Program," Nuclear Fuel, 24 April 1995, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



August 1994
As a result of Hamza's defection, Iraq admits that it had enriched uranium using the diffusion method.
—Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 336.



15 October 1994
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 949 demanding that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. [Iraq thereafter withdraws its forces and resumes its work with the Commission.]
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



2 April 1995
The Sunday Times of London publishes an erroneous story reporting that Hamza had been killed by the Iraqi intelligence service after sneaking out secret documents exposing Iraq's reconstituted nuclear weapons program.
—Khidhir Hamza, "Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, (54) 5, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/so98/so98hamza.html>; Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 295.



July 1995
Iraq threatens to end all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA if there is no progress towards the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo by 31 August 1995.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



August 1995
Iraq acknowledges that Karl-Heinz Schaab, a former German expert in the Urenco gas centrifuge enrichment program, provided Iraq with top-secret design know-how. It also admits that he had manufactured and exported a carbon fiber filament winding machine to Jordan, where it was awaiting re-export to Iraq at the advent of the Persian Gulf War.
—Mark Hibbs, "Future of IAEA in Iraq at Stake after Middle East Tension Rises," Nuclear Fuel, 23 September 1996, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



8 August 1995
Iraq informs UNSCOM that it is withdrawing its deadline to halt its cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



August 1995
Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, defects to Jordan, revealing to Western intelligence sources more than was previously know about Iraq's WMD programs.
—Shyam Bhatia and Daniel McGrory, "Brighter than the Baghdad Sun: Saddam's Race to Build the Bomb," (London: Little Brown and Company, 1999), pp. 235-240.



20 August 1995
Following the defection of Hussein Kamel, Iraq divulges information about its crash program during high-level technical talks. The Iraqi government denies that it had made a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons by stating that Kamel had tricked the Iraqi government and had developed a nuclear weapons program without the consent of the Iraqi government as evidenced by documents on Iraq's program found in Kamel's chicken farm. Nonetheless, Iraq's failure to declare its crash program and to give the IAEA all nuclear-related documents and materials constitute violations of Iraq's obligations under pertinent UN Security Council resolutions.
—UN Security Council, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>, pp. 65, 92; UN Security Council, "Eighth Report of the Director General of the IAEA on the Implementation of the Agency's Plan for the Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Paragraph 12 of Resolution 687 (1991)," S/1995/844, 6 October 1995, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1995_844.pdf>, p. 4; David Albright, "Iraq's Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War," Institute for Science and International Security, October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html>; Khidhir Hamza, "Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, (54) 5, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1998/so98/so98hamza.html>; Ann Scott Tyson, "How Arms Sleuths Battle Iraqi Deceit," Christian Science Monitor, 20 November 1997, cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.



September 1995
Saddam's second son, Qusay Hussein, assumes the responsibility of concealing Iraq's nuclear program.
—U.S. Department of State, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction," U.S. Government White Paper, 31 February 1998, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html>.



December 1995
Moayad Hassan Naji al-Janabi, an engineer in the Iraqi nuclear program, is shot dead in Amman, Jordan while seeking asylum from the United States or the United Kingdom.
—Jon Swain, "Mystery of Iraqi Nuclear Expert," Sunday Times, 2 April 1995, cited in <http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear/1995/n9513210.html>.



1996
Iraq provides a summary of enriched uranium output at Al Tarmiya which shows that less enriched material was produced than it declared in 1991.
—David Albright, "Iraq's Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War," Institute for Science and International Security, October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html>.



January 1996
Hussein Kamel returns to Baghdad and is subsequently assassinated.
—Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 330.



8 Feburary 1996
In an interview with Al-Majallah, Iraqi nuclear scientist Hussein al-Shahristani reveals that Saddam Hussein changed the peaceful nature of Iraq's nuclear program soon after taking power in July 1979 and instructed all scientific facilities to develop nuclear weapons. Al-Shahristani describes how Iraq has come close to enriching uranium to 93 percent with assistance from Western companies. He describes how during the 1980s, Iraq established 15 "major nuclear installations" capable of enriching uranium through centrifuge, electromagnetic separation (EMIS), and laser techniques. Western companies helped the Iraqi military develop complex detonation devices crucial to the successful explosion of a nuclear weapon. Al-Shahristani asserts that scientists who worked on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program are, for the most part, still in Iraq. [Al-Shahristani escaped detention in Iraq during the Gulf war. The date and location of this interview is not given.]
—"Scientist Views Iraq's, Iran's Nuclear Programs," FBIS-TAC-96-002,
12 February 1996, Original Source: Ghalib Darwis, Al-Majallah (London), 28 January 1996, pp. 22, 24.



27 March 1996
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1051 requiring UN members to provide the IAEA and UNSCOM with information on materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items. [Later, Iraq continues to negotiate contracts for procuring dual-use items with WMD application outside of UN controls.]
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4.



12 June 1996
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1060 demanding that Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and access to Iraq officials for interviews. [In reality, however, Iraq consistently sought to impede and limit UNSCOM's mission in Iraq by blocking access to numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to requested sites and individuals.]
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4.



21 June 1997
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1115 condemning Iraq's actions, and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews by UNSCOM. The Council also calls for an additional report on Iraq's cooperation with the Commission and suspends the periodic sanctions review.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



23 October 1997
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1134, which demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission, continues the suspension of the periodic sanctions reviews and foreshadows additional sanctions pending a further report on Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



November 1997
Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz pays Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov $800,000 for strategic materials from Moscow to build up its nuclear weapons stockpile.
—Seymour Hersh, "Saddam's Best Friend," New Yorker, 5 April 1999, <http://www.shmoo.com/mail/cypherpunks/apr99/msg00225.html>.



12 November 1997
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1137 condemning the continued violation by Iraq of its obligations, including its unacceptable decision to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with UNSCOM. It also imposes a travel restriction on Iraqi officials who are responsible for, or participated in the instances of non-compliance.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



1998
Iraq recalls its experienced nuclear scientists from Iraqi universities and civilian scientific centers to its nuclear program.
—"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Assessment of the British Government," <http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf>, p. 24.



2 March 1998
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1154 demanding that Iraq comply with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding with Iraq, providing for "severest consequences" if Iraq fails to comply.
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4.



Spring 1998
Iraq produces a document containing a summary of the technical achievements of its crash program which the IAEA regards to be consistent with its own assessment of the Iraqi crash program.
—"IAEA and Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/iaea.htm>.



9 September 1998
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1194 condemning Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, deeming Iraq's actions as a totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations. It also demands that Iraq rescind its decision and decides not to conduct the 60-day sanctions reviews until Iraq does so.
—UN Special Commission, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.



16 December 1998
Iraq ousts UN inspectors and prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraq facilities by UN aircrafts. Consequently, IAEA inspectors leave Iraq while stating that they are confident that Iraq's indigenous nuclear weapons program has not produced more than a few grams of weapons grade material.
—David Albright, "Iraq's Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War," Institute for Science and International Security, October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html>; Dr. John Chipman, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment," IISS Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002; US Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 5.



16-19 December 1998
A few hours after the withdrawal of UN weapons inspectors, the United States and the United Kingdom launch Operation Desert Fox that targets industrial facilities related to Iraq's ballistic missile program and a suspected biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security organizations that are involved in its WMD programs.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2002; "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Assessment of the British Government," <http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf>, p. 40.



15 June 1999
German engineer Karl-Heinz Schaab confesses to illegally selling blueprints for a gas ultra-centrifuge to Iraqi buyers in September 1989. [Later, he pays a $32,000 fine and receives a five year suspended sentence in Germany.]
—Robert Jaquet, "Construction Plans Sold to Iraq," Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 16 June 1999, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de>; "Six Years Jail Time Demanded for Nuclear Spy," Taz (Munich), 22 June 1999, <http://www.taz.de>; Jonathan Rhodes, "Saddam's Nuclear Quest: 1980-1991," efreedomnews, 22 September 2002, <http://www.efreedomnews.com/News%20Archive/Iraq/SpecialReportWaronIraq/M26NuclearQuest_I.htm>.



17 August 1999
IAEA Director-General Hans Blix says that there is evidence that Iraq is close to producing an operational nuclear weapon.
—Touraj Shiralilou, "Defuse Saddam," Iran Daily (Tehran), 17 August 1999, <http://www.iran-daily.com>.



25 August 1999
A classified US White House Report concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs is sent to Congress, The reports states that US intelligence is monitoring activities at Iraqi facilities "capable of producing WMD and long-range ballistic missiles." It is also examining possible Iraqi efforts to covertly purchase dual-use materials, substances and technologies that have both civilian and weapons applications.
—Matthew Campbell, "West Fears Saddam is on Brink of Building Nuclear Missile," Sunday Times (London), 5 September 1999, <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk>; Jonathan S. Landay, "Is Iraq Building Weapons Again," Christian Science Monitor, 30 August 1999, p. 1.



17 December 1999
In an attempt to enforce Iraqi compliance with UN disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1284, reaffirming all previous UN Security Council resolutions, disbanding UNSCOM, and establishing the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Iraq denounces the resolution on the grounds that it does not set a clear timetable or criteria for lifting sanctions.
—Dr. John Chipman, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment," IISS Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 4; "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction—The Assessment of the British Government," <http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf>, p. 41.



December 1999-October 2002
UNMOVIC screens Iraqi contracts pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1284 and finds more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items that could be diverted into WMD programs.
—U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm>, p. 25.



12 January 2000
Iraq reports that it will allow inspectors from the IAEA visit Iraq to inspect its stockpiles of uranium.
—Barbara Crossette, "Iraq to Allow Nuclear Inspections Again," New York Times, 13 January 2000.



25 January 2000
IAEA inspectors resume nuclear inspections in Iraq.
—Barbara Crossette, "Iraq to Allow Nuclear Inspections Again," New York Times, 13 January 2000.



September 2000
Saddam Hussein publicly exhorts his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy," contributing to the growing concern about a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
—Bill Gertz, "Iraq Seeks Steel Use to Make Nukes," Washington Times, 26 July 2002.



15 April 2001
Iraqi scientist Hussein al-Shahrastani, who escaped from an Iraqi prison in 1991, affirms that Saddam Hussein would have been able to produce a nuclear bomb, had he delayed the invasion of Kuwait by six months. Al-Shahrastani also asserts that Iraq still maintains a nuclear weapons program saying, "I know very well that the Iraqi regime had built and laid the foundation for nuclear installations. It had also developed a nuclear program under Jabal Himrin in northern Iraq. This project was extremely secretive, and the inspection committees did not visit it. No information is available about it or about the equipment and installations that exist there. The information I have is that Iraq is currently developing its atomic program at the nuclear installations under Jabal Himrin and not at the nuclear research center in the Al-Tuwaythah district where such facilities no longer exist." [Khidhir Hamza also concurs with the assertion that Saddam's invasion of Kuwait thwarted an Iraqi nuclear bomb, writing in his book, "[N]ow we had all the pieces in place to make it [a bomb] work, I assured [Hussein] Kamel. The bomb was in sight. The only problem was Saddam. On August 2, he invaded Kuwait. And everything came to a halt."]
—Mu'add Fayyad, "Iraqi Nuclear Scientist Reveals Iraq's Nuclear Installations, Capabilities," Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 15 April 2001; cited in FBIS 20010415000047; "Interview with Husayn Shahrastani," al-Majalla (London), 28 January-3 February 1996.



6 February 2002
Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet testifies before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He says, "We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Iraq retains a significant number of nuclear scientists, program documentation, and probably some dual-use manufacturing infrastructure that could support a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program. Baghdad's access to foreign expertise could support a rejuvenated program, but our major near-term concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 38 June 2002.



Mid-June 2002
Procurement agents from Iraq's covert nuclear-arms program are detected as they attempt to purchase stainless-steel tubing, that could used in gas centrifuges and a key component in making nuclear bombs. [Stainless-steel tubing is considered "dual-use" with non-nuclear uses for developing artillery, anti-tank rockets, and multiple rocket launch systems. Thus, the dispute is whether enough evidence exists to state that the tubes were definitely ordered for the gas centrifuge program.]
—Bill Gertz, "Iraq Seeks Steel Used to Make Nukes," Washington Times, 26 July 2002; "Aluminum Tubing Is an Indicator of an Iraqi Gas Centrifuge Program: But Is the Tubing Specifically for Centrifuges," Institute for Science and International Security, 9 October 2002, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/aluminumtubes.html>.



9 September 2002
Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) Director Dr. John Chipman notes the following regarding the Iraq's current nuclear capacity: (1) Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons; (2) Iraq would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to build such fissile material production facilities; (3) It could, however, assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained; and (4) It could divert domestic civil-use radioisotopes or seek to obtain foreign material for a crude radiological device.
—Dr. John Chipman, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment," IISS Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002.



14 November 2002
The UN Security Council enacts Resolution 1441 demanding that Iraq comply with its obligations to disarm as required by this resolution and other UN Security Council resolutions.
—David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Now for the Hard Part: Implementing Strengthened Inspections in Iraq," Institute for Science and International Security, 14 November 2002,
<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/implementing1441.html>.



25 November 2002
UN inspectors arrive in Baghdad to begin inspections.
—Richard C. Hottelet, "Inspectors Due Monday, Hussein Inspects Remaining Trump Cards," Christian Science Monitor, 18 November 2002, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; James Dao, "U.N. Inspectors Arrive in Iraq," New York Times, 25 November 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/25/international/25CND-IRAQ.html>.

9 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohammad El-Baradei says he finds credible Iraq’s claim that it sought high-strength aluminum tubes for use in building 81mm rockets, not for a centrifuge system to enrich uranium as the Bush administration has accused.
—Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: Nuclear Technology; Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited by Bush," New York Times, 10 January 2003.



16 January 2003
UN inspectors discover documents related to Iraq’s nuclear program at the home of Iraqi physicist Faleh Hassan. The documents are discovered as the inspectors begin making unannounced visits to private homes of interest in Iraq. The documents at Dr. Hassan’s house appear to be related to laser enrichment, which could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Experts disagree about the significance of the find, however, as it is unclear whether the documents are decades-old or part of an official research program conducted by the Iraqi nuclear regime. Dr. Hassan, who is the director of the Al-Razi military industrial facility, claims the documents reflect his private research work and the graduate work of students he supervised.
—George Jahn, "Countdown to War: Iraq: Nuclear Data Found in Scientist’s Home," Independent, 19 January 2003.



29 January 2003
US President George W. Bush delivers his annual State of the Union address. In the speech, Bush promises to lead a coalition to disarm Iraq if Saddam Hussein does not do so by his own accord. Bush also says the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein attempted recently to acquire substantial quantities of uranium from Africa. In addition, according to Bush, US intelligence sources have reported that Hussein has sought to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes that are suitable for nuclear weapons production.—"President’s State of the Union Address to Congress and the Nation," New York Times, 29 January 2003.



30 January 2003
The United States discloses some of the evidence it intends to present to the UN Security Council as proof that Iraq continues its nuclear weapons program. The evidence includes declassified intelligence relating to the controversial purchase of aluminum tubes, which the United States claims were to be used to build centrifuges to enrich uranium. Specifically, the materials offer details about the unusual strength and design specificity of the tubes that the Iraqis ordered, as well as the surprisingly high price the Iraqis paid for the shipment and the great lengths they went to avoid international detection of the shipment.
—Roland Watson and Elaine Monaghan, "US says aluminum tubes are evidence of Iraq’s nuclear goal," Times (London), 31 January 2003.



3 February 2003
A former high-ranking Iraqi nuclear scientist says the United States is purposely exaggerating the potential risk from Iraq’s alleged nuclear program. Downplaying the threat, scientist Imad Khadduri claims that the 1991 Gulf War effectively destroyed Iraq’s nuclear program and that the country has since lacked the qualified management team necessary to resurrect the dormant program. Khadduri is now living in Canada where he teaches computer science at a Toronto college.—Jeffrey Hodgson, "Iraq has no nuclear weapons, former top scientist says," Ottawa Citizen, 4 February 2003.



5 February 2003
Speaking at a meeting of the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell charges that Saddam Hussein remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Powell says Hussein has made secretive attempts to procure highly specialized aluminum tubes that can be used in centrifuges for enriching uranium. He also points to Iraq’s efforts to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines, both of which can be used in a uranium enrichment gas centrifuge program. Powell says that he believes these procurement efforts reflect Iraq’s desire to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, namely by creating an indigenous capability to produce fissile material. Powell also notes that Saddam Hussein has focused increased attention on Iraq’s scientific community during the past 18 months, a group that includes Iraq’s nuclear community.
—"Remarks to the United Nations Security Council," Secretary of State Colin Powell, 5 February 2003, http://www.state.gov.



14 February 2003
IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei issues an interim report to the UN Security Council on inspectors’ activities related to Iraq’s nuclear program. Among the developments since the IAEA’s last report three weeks ago, the IAEA has determined that Iraq’s procurement of the dual-use carbon-fiber material was not for use in a nuclear program. However, efforts to identify the intended purpose for high-strength aluminum tubes continue. The report also states that the IAEA has reviewed 2,000 pages found at the home of a nuclear scientist on 16 January and assessed these papers do not contain information that changes the IAEA’s past assessments of Iraq’s nuclear programs.
—“The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update,� IAEA Director General Dr. Mohammed El-Baradei, 14 February 2003, <http://www.un.org/>.



7 March 2003
In a report to the UN Security Council, the IAEA states that in recent weeks Iraq has provided it with considerable documentation related to issues of particular concern. The report also says IAEA inspectors have concluded that it is unlikely Iraq sought high-strength aluminum tubes for a centrifuge program, as the Bush administration claims. With regard to Iraq’s efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets or develop the capability to produce them indigenously, the IAEA concludes none of the magnets or magnet production plans that Iraq has declared could be used specifically in a centrifuge magnetic bearing. The report notes, however, that Iraq does possess the technical know-how and capability to manufacture magnets suitable for enrichment centrifuges, and therefore the IAEA plans to continue monitoring developments in this area. In terms of uranium acquisition, the IAEA has concluded that controversial documents purportedly proving Iraq tried to acquire enriched uranium from Niger are inauthentic. The IAEA report also states that there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities at Iraqi facilities identified in satellite imagery as having been reconstructed or newly built, and there is no sign of other proscribed nuclear-related activities at IAEA inspected sites.
—"The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update," International Atomic Energy Agency at the Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, 7 March 2003.



19 March 2003
The onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom and subsequent invasion and occupation of Iraq by US-led coalition forces. One of the main rationales for this military operation is rooted in the belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been deceiving the international community and hiding its WMD arsenals and capabilities.



10 April 2003
A US Army unit arrives at Iraq’s main nuclear research center, the Tuwaitha facility 30km south of Baghdad, to measure radiation levels after a Marine engineering company discovered the site had been abandoned and infiltrated by looters following the recent fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Army determines that the radiation levels exceed safety limits. Responding to this discovery, IAEA Director General sends the US government a letter noting the immediate need to secure the Tuwaitha site.
—Walter Pincus, “U.S., IAEA Negotiate Sending Teams to Iraq; Agency Concerned About Nuclear Sites,� Washington Post, 21 May 2003.

11 April 2003
The IAEA says it has asked the United States to secure the Tuwaitha nuclear research center in Iraq after US forces detected high levels of radioactivity at the site on 10 April. IAEA Director General Mohammad El-Baradei says that Washington responded by agreeing to guard the complex and restrict access to it. El-Baradei also notes that some high radiation levels are normal at Tuwaitha since Iraq was permitted to retain uranium there under UN resolutions.
—"Nuclear facilities closely watched," Gazette, 12 April 2003; Christopher Adams and Mark Huband, "US engineers draw another blank over suspected weapons site," Financial Times, 12 April 2003.




14 April 2003
A US official speaking on the condition of anonymity says top Iraqi nuclear scientist J’affar Dhia J’affar is in US custody. He reportedly turned himself in to coalition forces.
—"Nuclear scientist surrenders to US," Australian, 15 April 2003.



20 May 2003
According to a US State Department official, the United States has commenced discussions with the IAEA to facilitate the return of IAEA inspection teams to Iraq. The IAEA inspectors will be charged with ascertaining what may have been pilfered from nuclear-related sites. The discussions are taking place one day after IAEA Deputy General Mohammad El-Baradei issued a statement expressing concern about vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials in Iraq, especially at the Tuwaitha nuclear research center. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld states that the Pentagon has "no problem with" the return of UN inspectors to Iraq.
—Walter Pincus, "U.S., IAEA Negotiate Sending Teams to Iraq; Agency Concerned About Nuclear Sites," Washington Post, 21 May 2003; Julian Borger, "Iraq: after the war: US dirty bomb fears after nuclear looting," Guardian, 21 May 2003.



29 May 2003
US military officials in Iraq notify the IAEA that its inspectors will be barred from entering the Tuwaitha nuclear research center when they arrive in the country next week. Moreover, according to the IAEA, the inspectors will eventually be permitted to perform only the minimum extent of checks required by international law, which amounts to conducting an inventory of one small area at the center where radioactive material was stored before the war. The inspectors will not be permitted to conduct an investigation of public health claims linked to the looting of nuclear materials from the center, nor will they be involved in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction.
—Julian Borger, “Iraq: after the war: Looting inquiry ban on nuclear inspectors,� Guardian, 30 May 2003.



7 June 2003
UN nuclear inspectors arrive in Iraq for the first time in three months to evaluate the damage caused by looting at the Tuwaitha nuclear research center.
— "Nuclear Agency Returns to Iraq; U.N. Team’s Task Is at Looted Plant," Washington Post, 7 June 2003.



25 June 2003
An American official says that the former head of Iraq’s centrifuge uranium-enrichment program, Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, has given the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents and parts related to Iraq’s nuclear program, which Ubaydi had concealed for 12 years. The documents were reportedly hidden beneath a rose bush in a garden next to Ubaydi’s home. According to Ubaydi, Iraq’s senior leadership ordered that the documents be concealed so as to preserve the regime’s ability to restart efforts to build a centrifuge enrichment capability sometime in the future.
—"After the War; Old Nuclear Parts Are Turned Over in Iraq," New York Times, 26 June 2003.



6 July 2003
Former American ambassador Joseph C. Wilson publishes an editorial in the New York Times in which he states that some of the information used by the Bush administration to build support for the invasion of Iraq was exaggerated. Specifically, Wilson refers to the administration’s claims about Iraq’s purported attempt to buy uranium yellowcake in Africa. Wilson identifies himself as the individual that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent to Niger in early 2002 to investigate an intelligence report related to this allegation. The CIA informed him that the intelligence report referred to a memorandum of agreement from the late 1990s, although Wilson never saw the report itself. He also writes that the CIA told him Vice President Dick Cheney’s office had questioned the intelligence report and were awaiting further details about it. Wilson’s investigation ultimately found it unlikely that any such agreement existed or transfer took place. He, in turn, filed a report detailing these findings upon his return from Niger. He says he was dismayed in subsequent months, however, when the Bush administration joined a British report in citing Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium yellowcake from Niger as evidence of Saddam Hussein’s ongoing nuclear ambitions.
—Joseph Wilson, "What I Didn’t Find in Africa," New York Times, 6 July 2003.



2 October 2003
In his testimony on the interim progress of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) given to members of the US House of Representatives, chief inspector David Kay says the ISG has determined from the testimony of Iraqi scientists and senior government officials that Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition, Kay reports that Iraq took action to preserve some technological capability from its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Kay also says that inspectors have not yet uncovered evidence demonstrating Iraq took significant post-1998 steps towards building nuclear weapons or producing fissile material.
—"Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," Central Intelligence Agency, 2 October 2003, <http://www.cia.gov/
cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html/>.



30 March 2004
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) chief inspector Charles Duelfer testifies before the US Congress. He says that the ISG has developed information which suggests Iraq maintained an interest in both preserving and expanding its knowledge base related to the development of nuclear weapons. According to Duelfer, one indicator of this interest is a high-speed rail gun program conducted under the direction of two senior scientists who were associated with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program before the first Gulf War. Documents obtained from the scientists’ office demonstrate an important incongruity between the ostensible purpose of this research and the actual speeds of the rail gun being developed. Other documents discovered in the office also describe diagnostic techniques which are important for nuclear weapons experiments. These include x-ray radiography, high-speed photography, and laser velocimetry. In addition, Duelfer notes that the ISG has expanded its areas of focus to include an investigation of the regime’s intent.
—"Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 March 2004, http://www.cia.gov/.



14 April 2004
IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei circulates a letter to the UN Security Council that says equipment, contaminated scrap, and even buildings where radioactive materials were monitored prior to the war in Iraq, have disappeared. He also states in the letter that it remains unclear whether the disappearance of these items was the result of a systematic effort or looting. Meanwhile, visits to other countries and satellite imagery have together shown that scrap, some of it contaminated from sites previously monitored by the IAEA, was transported out of Iraq.
—"Contaminated Scrap Missing From Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 15 April 2004; Mark Turner, "IAEA raises fears on Iraq nuclear sites," Financial Times, 15 April 2004.



6 July 2004
The US Department of Energy announces that US authorities have seized approximately 1,000 sources of radioactivity and two tons of low-enriched uranium from the Tuwaitha nuclear research center in Iraq. These items are being shipped to an unidentified location in the United States. Officials also say that some of the "less sensitive" materials at the center were left there.
—Matthew L. Wald, "Radioactive Material Seized From a Nuclear Plant in Iraq," New York Times, 7 July 2004.



30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) releases a comprehensive report detailing its findings related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. In it, the ISG reports that Saddam Hussein wanted to recreate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities after sanctions were removed. Inspectors also believe that while Hussein aspired to develop a nuclear weapons capability, his post-sanction planning was more geared toward the development of ballistic missiles and tactical chemical warfare capabilities. Among its other findings, the ISG says Saddam Hussein ended Iraq’s nuclear program following the first Gulf War in 1991. No evidence suggests a coordinated effort to restart that program thereafter. Hussein did, however, express his intent to maintain the intellectual capital that had developed within the nuclear program prior to 1991, but the ISG found that this was in a process of decay in successive years. Iraq also sought to conceal elements of its program from inspectors following the 1991 war. The regime’s secretive efforts included concealing and preserving documents related to the nuclear program, hiding technology, and transferring many nuclear scientists to jobs in Iraq’s Military Industrial Commission (MIC) where they would maintain their weapons knowledge and gain ongoing hands-on experience. In addition, the ISG report states that specific projects, including efforts to build a rail gun and copper vapor laser, might have been useful in future activities aimed at restarting a nuclear weapons program, but they did not uncover evidence of such a purpose. The report also concludes that Saddam Hussein purposefully sought to spread ambiguity about his weapons of mass destruction capabilities. According to interviews conducted by the ISG, he privately told his aides that he sought to deceive the world about his weapons capabilities in order to avoid appearing weak as well as to deter aggression from Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran. However, the inspectors’ analysis concludes that the regime never reconciled the inherent contradiction between international demands for disarmament and this desire to maintain a strategic deterrent.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, http://www.cia.gov/.



11 October 2004
The IAEA expresses concern that missing Iraqi nuclear-related equipment and materials may be sold to groups or countries interested in producing nuclear weapons. The IAEA says US-led coalition forces failed to notice that equipment and materials have been disappearing from Iraq since the start of the 2003 war. An IAEA spokesman says that dual-use items were "systematically removed" from facilities the IAEA monitored prior to the war.
—Louis Charbonneau, "U.N. fears bombmakers may get Iraq nuke items - diplomats," Reuters, 12 October 2004.



13 October 2004
The BBC reports that former chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix and former chief Iraq Survey Group (ISG) inspector David Kay both believe the coalition’s loss of control over Iraq’s nuclear facilities following the 2003 invasion is scandalous. Kay reportedly added, however, that the loss of nuclear-related equipment and material is not by itself dangerous, because such items are often legally available outside of Iraq.
—"Iraq nuclear losses ‘a scandal’," BBC News, 13 October 2003, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/.


13 October 2004
Rashad Omar, technology minister in Iraq's interim government, says that although US troops secured sensitive nuclear facilities soon after the war began, missing equipment from nuclear plants was removed by looters in the time immediately after the US-led invasion began. He adds that while he has no information to confirm reports about buildings being torn down in the past at the Tuwaitha site, eight buildings are currently being renovated there in an effort to transform the site into a science and technology park where peaceful research will take place.
--"No WMD but has nuclear equipment gone to terrorists?" Herald (Glasgow), 13 October 2004.

13 October 2004
Iraqi staff at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex provides tours of the facility to journalists in an effort to counter reports that large quantities of equipment are missing from nuclear facilities in Iraq. This tour includes a visit to "Location C", where 550 tons of yellowcake uranium and other nuclear materials have been logged and stored by the IAEA. Journalists are also shown a hole in the barbed wire near to the Location C building. In addition, workers at the facility interviewed by journalists say that since the war, Americans have removed far more equipment and materials from the facility than did Iraqi looters. They also say that employees of the US firm Raytheon have been spotted at the facility trying to account for looted items.
--Charles Clover, "Inside Iraq's 'looted' nuclear reactor site," Financial Times, 14 October 2004.

Mid-October 2004
Reports emerge that the Iraqi interim government has warned the United States and other international parties about approximately 380 tons of high-powered conventional explosives--mainly HMX and RDX--that are missing from the Al-Qaqaa military installation. These explosives are used by countries around the world to destroy buildings, fabricate missile warheads and detonate nuclear weapons. The Al-Qaqaa facility is a large site where the former regime stored massive amounts of military equipment and materials. The facility and its contents were under the supervision of the IAEA prior to the US-led invasion, and the US military was responsible for its control following the 2003 war.
--James Glanz, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Huge Cache of Explosives Vanished From Site in Iraq," New York Times, 25 October 2004.

25 October 2004
The IAEA and the White House confirm that large quantities of conventional explosives including RDX, PETN, and HMX are missing from the Al-Qaqaa military installation. Some of this material was under UN seal prior to the US-led invasion. An IAEA spokeswoman says that the Iraqi government has said the material was removed due to a lack of security. According to reports, the IAEA was notified about the missing material by the Iraqi government around October 10.
--Colum Lynch and Bradley Graham, "Iraqi Explosives Missing, U.N. Is Told," Washington Post, 26 October 2004; Mark Mazzetti and Maggie Farley, "The Conflict in Iraq: White House Downplays Missing Iraq Explosives," Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2004; Charles Clover and Guy Dinmore, "Tonnes of explosives missing in Iraq," Financial Times (London), 26 October 2004.

25 October 2004
Former chief inspector of the Iraq Survey Group David Kay says that he believes the missing explosives were removed from the Al-Qaqaa facility sometime in April or May 2003 immediately following the war.
--Mark Mazzetti and Maggie Farley, "The Conflict in Iraq: White House Downplays Missing Iraq Explosives," Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2004.

25 October 2004
The Pentagon says the 380 tons of explosives missing from the Al-Qaqaa military installation in Iraq were removed sometime over a 2-1/2 month period during the spring of 2003. This period of time includes several weeks before and after Baghdad fell to US-led forces.
--Bradley Graham, "U.S. Thinks Explosives Vanished in Spring '03," Washington Post, 27 October 2004.

26 October 2004
White House officials reassert that the missing conventional explosives from Al-Qaqaa military installation were not on hand when soldiers from the Army's 101st Airborne Division visited the complex on 10 April 2003, which was the day after coalition forces took over Baghdad. In an interview, however, the unit's commander says his troops did not search the site during that visit and are thus unable to comment as to whether the explosives were there at that time.
--Jim Dwyer and David E. Sanger, "No Check of Bunker, Unit Commander Says," New York Times, 27 October 2004.

27 October 2004
An affiliate station in the ABC television network in the United States broadcasts a videotape of a television crew with American troops at the Al-Qaqaa military installation on April 18, nine days after the fall of Baghdad. The videotape shows a massive supply of explosives still on hand at the facility at that time. It is unclear if the explosives captured on camera were in fact those now missing from the facility. However, images of what appears to be an IAEA seal across the doors of one bunker suggests that the bunker may have contained HMX, as this was the only material under such seal when the IAEA left Iraq prior to the onset of the war, according to the IAEA.
--William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Video Shows G.I.'s at Weapon Cache," New York Times, 29 October 2004.

29 October 2004
The Pentagon releases an aerial photo showing two semi-trailers situated outside a weapons bunker at the Al-Qaqaa facility two days prior to the start of the March 2003 war. It is unclear which bunker the trucks are parked in front of, or what if anything was being loaded into them. The Pentagon also reports that US Army soldiers removed approximately 250 tons of material from the Al-Qaqaa facility in April 2003, although officials are unable to confirm exactly what material was taken from the storage bunkers.
--Jonathan Landay, "Trucks linked to missing explosives," Daily Telegraph, 30 October 2004; Bradley Graham and Colum Lynch, "Pentagon: Army Took Munitions," Washington Post, 30 October 2004.

3 November 2004
A group of US Army reservists and National Guardsmen claim they witnessed looting at the Al-Qaqaa military installation in the weeks following the fall of Baghdad. The soldiers say they were among approximately one dozen troops guarding the facility. According to the soldiers, their requests to commanders for additional troops to secure the facility went unheeded. They also say that due to the small size of their contingency, they were unable to prevent looters from pilfering material under their watch. They describe Iraqis in Toyota trucks plundering explosives from the unsecured bunkers.
--Mark Mazzetti, "Soldiers Describe Looting of Explosives," Los Angeles Times, 4 November 2004.

4 November 2004
IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei criticizes both the Bush administration for its handling of Iraq and the UN Security Council for practicing double standards in its approach to proliferation issues. ElBaradei says that pre-war inspections were working in Iraq and that the IAEA has been proven correct in assessing Iraq did not possess a nuclear weapons program. He also calls for new efforts to bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including by introducing a mechanism to keep non-nuclear weapon states from developing the means to enrich uranium. They are allowed to do so under the current NPT agreement, with the caveat that such enrichment occur only for peaceful purposes. He argues this has created facilities which quickly can be transformed into weapons-grade enrichment programs.
--Robert Collier and James Sterngold, "Top U.N. arms inspector slams Bush," San Francisco Chronicle, 5 November 2004.

21 December 2004
Iraqi nuclear scientist and Municipal Council member Dr. Talib Ibrahim Zahir is assassinated by an unidentified gunman in Kharnabat, Iraq. Before his death, Dr. Zahir had been an employee of Diyala University.
--"US Troops Injured in Blast; Iraqi Nuclear Scientist 'Assassinated,'" Al-Jazeera, 21 December 2004.

12 January 2005
United States intelligence officials confirm the search for weapons of mass destruction has been brought to a halt. US chief investigator for the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer reported in 2004 that his team had found no stockpiles of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons at the time of the US-led invasion, and now asserts they have not found any since. The belief in the existence of such a stockpile had been the main reason cited for the war in Iraq.
--"US Gives up Search for Iraq WMDs," BBC, 12 January 2005.

12 January 2005
With the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq discontinued, the Iraq Survey Group's 30 September 2004 report, which maintains there are no stockpiles of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Iraq, is considered the definitive account of the CIA's findings. The search lasted until this date due to the administration's suspicion that weapons had been taken out of Iraq or hidden well within the country; however intelligence officials have come to the conclusion that such speculation is highly unlikely.
--Dafna Linzer, "Search for Banned Arms in Iraq Ended Last Month; Critical September Report to be Final Word," Washington Post, 12 January 2005.

27 January 2005
Jafar Dhia Jafar, commonly known as the father of Iraq's nuclear program, says his country's pursuit of nuclear weapons ended with the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Jafar asserts he was three years away from achieving nuclear capabilities at the time, with a team of about 8,000 people involved in the nuclear program, but Operation Desert Storm prevented further developments.
--Doug Mellgren, "1991 Gulf War Stopped Baghdad's Atomic and Biological Weapons, Top Iraqi Scientist Says," Associated Press, 27 January 2005.

27 January 2005
Former United Nations senior weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, Scott Ritter, criticizes the invasion of Iraq and blames politicians, as well as media and the pubic for embarking upon an illegal war. He accuses the Bush administration of dismissing Iraqi declarations of WMD holdings as lies, as well as advertising fabricated information about such holdings, and "spinning" data found by the Iraq Survey Group in order to further the purposes of the White House.
--Scott Ritter, "Criminals the Lot of Us. The Invasion of Iraq Was a Crime of Gigantic Proportions, for Which Politicians, the Media and the Public Share Responsibility," The Guardian, 27 January 2005.

1 February 2005
The CIA releases an unusual report officially disavowing those assessments that it made prior to the invasion of Iraq due to subsequent findings that disprove such notions. The report, dated 18 January 2005, is titled "Iraq: No Large-Scale Chemical Warfare Efforts since Early 1990s" and claims Iraq gave up its chemical and nuclear weapons programs in 1991. The report is considered unusual by the intelligence community due to the fact that the CIA generally does not contradict prior intelligence estimates. The Iraq Survey Group provided the information for the report, and David Kay, former head of the team, asserts "we were almost all wrong."
--Greg Miller, "CIA Corrects Itself on Arms," Los Angeles Times, 1 February 2005.

13 February 2005
Recent findings by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency reveal that Dr. A. Q. Khan, the country's lead nuclear scientist currently under house arrest in Islamabad, at one time had approached Saddam Hussein's regime with an offer to sell Baghdad nuclear technology. One ISI official claims Baghdad seemed interested and agreed initially, only to back out later citing suspicion of possible US involvement in the solicitation, which would implicate the Iraqis of having the desire to develop nuclear weapons technology.
--Massoud Ansari, "Our Man Sold Secrets to Iran, Admits Pakistan," The Telegraph, 13 February 2005.
17 February 2005
Former head of Iraq’s nuclear program under the Saddam Hussein regime, Jafar Dhia Jafar, admonishes the International Atomic Energy Agency for failing to provide adequate resistance in the debate over Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction prior to the U.S.-led invasion. Jafar accuses the IAEA of bowing to U.S. pressure when the agency should have made stronger assurances to the U.N. Security Council on nuclear disarmament in Iraq.
––“IAEA Should Have Stood Up to U.S., Says Former Iraqi Official,� Deutsche Press-Agentur, 17 February 2005.

18 February 2005
Porter Goss, the new Director of the CIA, warns the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the repercussions of the war in Iraq could possibly lead to increased risk in the U.S. due to terrorist acquisition of technology and weapons of mass destruction. He says “those jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build trans-national terrorist cells and networks.�
––Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Iraq War Fuelling Terrorism: CIA,� Global News Wire, 18 February 2005.

3 March 2005
The United States opposes Mohammed ElBaradei’s confirmation to a third term as director-general of the IAEA, citing such reasons as a two-term limitation, as well as not being strong enough on issues with Iran, and his failure to confirm U.S. claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein administration.
––“UN Nuclear Boss Talks Deadlocked,� BBC, 3 March 2005.

4 March 2005
Hans Blix, the former United Nations chief weapons inspector speaks of Iraq’s continued possession of nuclear weapons technical expertise in an epilogue to the new version of his book Disarming Iraq, which was originally published in 2004. The additional epilogue expresses Blix’s proposal for a less “nuclearized� world. He encourages the idea of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East, and cites Iraq’s retention of nuclear know-how and possible nuclear future as reasons to push for such a zone.
––Charles J. Hanley, “Iraq Arms Controller Urges Nuke-Free Mideast, Raps ‘Misleading’ U.S. Leadership,� Associated Press, 4 March 2005.

9 March 2005
The interim Iraqi government appeals to the United Nations to end the presence of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency personnel responsible for disposing of the country’s alleged nuclear program. Iraq’s ambassador to the UN, Samir Sumaidai says UNMOVIC costs Iraq $12 million annually, and also claims the IAEA will cost them $12.3 million over the next two years. This money comes out of Iraq’s oil revenue, which the country wants to use for reconstruction purposes, rather than funding “irrelevant� UN bodies. UN Security Council members agree that they must begin to examine the future of these bodies in Iraq, but also are hesitant to do so until the permanent Iraqi government is in place.
––“UN Takes No Action on Iraq Inspections,� Al-Jazeera, 9 March 2005.

18 March 2005
Despite the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, the former head of the organization, believes that there was intent in Iraq to continue production of WMD. Due to the continued presence of hundreds of Iraqi scientists known to be ‘luminaries’ within their fields of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the return of expatriate Iraqi scientists, the possibility exists of renewed nuclear research. Most nuclear research facilities are not functioning currently, but are instead being maintained for use in the future following reconstruction. However, because such rejuvenated projects will require many resources and much funding, restarting these programs currently remains a remote possibility.
––“Weapons Expertise in Iraq and Iran,� Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 18 March 2005.

20 March 2005
Iraqi newspaper Al-Furat publishes a claim that an Israeli delegation has met with Kurdish political leader Jalal Talabani. The negotiations are said to have involved the Kurdish desire to establish a nuclear reactor in the north of Iraq for peaceful energy purposes. The members of the delegation from Israel are identified as technical consultants with European passports. The Kurds allegedly plan to begin work on the reactor in the middle of this year.
––“Iraq Kurdish Party Leader, ‘Israeli’ Nuclear Experts Said in Kurdistan Talks,� BBC, 20 March 2005.

25 March 2005
A presidential commission is preparing a review of 15 U.S. agencies that were involved in the collection and/or assessment of intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and is not likely to be complimentary to any of the agencies. The report will assess the reasons why intelligence believed Saddam Hussein was reconstructing Iraq’s nuclear program.
––Katherine Shrader, “WMD Commission Prepares to Release Report,� Associated Press, 25 March 2005.

27 March 2005
Iraqi former nuclear scientist Hussein al-Shahristani is named by the United Iraqi Alliance as its candidate for deputy to the parl
Botnst is offline  
post #16 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 10:02 PM
BenzWorld Elite
 
azimuth's Avatar
 
Date registered: Jan 2005
Posts: 2,369
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 0 Post(s)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

*Fingers plugging ears, eyes wide shut* Ihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushihate bushihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushi hatebushihatebushihatebush!

aborted Shop Forum member

azimuth is offline  
post #17 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-01-2005, 10:19 PM
BenzWorld Elite
 
Date registered: Sep 2004
Vehicle: 2014 E250 Bluetec 4-Matic, 1983 240D 4-Speed
Location: USA
Posts: 9,257
Mentioned: 3 Post(s)
Quoted: 256 Post(s)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

Quote:
azimuth - 11/2/2005 12:02 AM

*Fingers plugging ears, eyes wide shut* Ihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushihate bushihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushihatebushi hatebushihatebushihatebush!
By George, I think you've got it! You can actually come to the conclusion that closing your eyes wide shut and plugging your ears doesn't help make him look or sound any more like a leader. All you need is your nose. He stinks as a leader. Jim
JimSmith is offline  
post #18 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-02-2005, 08:02 AM
BenzWorld Senior Member
 
That Guy's Avatar
 
Date registered: Sep 2004
Vehicle: '01 C320
Location: Washington DC
Posts: 564
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 0 Post(s)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

Quote:
Botnst - 11/1/2005 9:34 PM

10 April 2003
A US Army unit arrives at Iraq’s main nuclear research center, the Tuwaitha facility 30km south of Baghdad, to measure radiation levels after a Marine engineering company discovered the site had been abandoned and infiltrated by looters following the recent fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Army determines that the radiation levels exceed safety limits. Responding to this discovery, IAEA Director General sends the US government a letter noting the immediate need to secure the Tuwaitha site.
—Walter Pincus, “U.S., IAEA Negotiate Sending Teams to Iraq; Agency Concerned About Nuclear Sites,� Washington Post, 21 May 2003.

11 April 2003
The IAEA says it has asked the United States to secure the Tuwaitha nuclear research center in Iraq after US forces detected high levels of radioactivity at the site on 10 April. IAEA Director General Mohammad El-Baradei says that Washington responded by agreeing to guard the complex and restrict access to it. El-Baradei also notes that some high radiation levels are normal at Tuwaitha since Iraq was permitted to retain uranium there under UN resolutions.
—"Nuclear facilities closely watched," Gazette, 12 April 2003; Christopher Adams and Mark Huband, "US engineers draw another blank over suspected weapons site," Financial Times, 12 April 2003.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) releases a comprehensive report detailing its findings related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. In it, the ISG reports that Saddam Hussein wanted to recreate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities after sanctions were removed. Inspectors also believe that while Hussein aspired to develop a nuclear weapons capability, his post-sanction planning was more geared toward the development of ballistic missiles and tactical chemical warfare capabilities. Among its other findings, the ISG says Saddam Hussein ended Iraq’s nuclear program following the first Gulf War in 1991. No evidence suggests a coordinated effort to restart that program thereafter. Hussein did, however, express his intent to maintain the intellectual capital that had developed within the nuclear program prior to 1991, but the ISG found that this was in a process of decay in successive years. Iraq also sought to conceal elements of its program from inspectors following the 1991 war. The regime’s secretive efforts included concealing and preserving documents related to the nuclear program, hiding technology, and transferring many nuclear scientists to jobs in Iraq’s Military Industrial Commission (MIC) where they would maintain their weapons knowledge and gain ongoing hands-on experience. In addition, the ISG report states that specific projects, including efforts to build a rail gun and copper vapor laser, might have been useful in future activities aimed at restarting a nuclear weapons program, but they did not uncover evidence of such a purpose. The report also concludes that Saddam Hussein purposefully sought to spread ambiguity about his weapons of mass destruction capabilities. According to interviews conducted by the ISG, he privately told his aides that he sought to deceive the world about his weapons capabilities in order to avoid appearing weak as well as to deter aggression from Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran. However, the inspectors’ analysis concludes that the regime never reconciled the inherent contradiction between international demands for disarmament and this desire to maintain a strategic deterrent.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, http://www.cia.gov/.
I bolded the parts that are applicable to Guage's propaganda post.

Bot,

So based on your post, are you saying that newsmax is a biased site?
That Guy is offline  
post #19 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-02-2005, 08:17 AM
BenzWorld Elite
 
azimuth's Avatar
 
Date registered: Jan 2005
Posts: 2,369
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 0 Post(s)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

Quote:
That Guy - 11/2/2005 10:02 AM



I bolded the parts that are applicable to Guage's propaganda post.

Bot,

So based on your post, are you saying that newsmax is a biased site?

Oh, I don't think there's any doubt that the editorial liscense of news max leans right.

aborted Shop Forum member

azimuth is offline  
post #20 of 24 (permalink) Old 11-02-2005, 09:27 AM Thread Starter
BenzWorld Elite
 
FeelTheLove's Avatar
 
Date registered: Sep 2004
Vehicle: 83 Astral Silver 280 SL
Location: Planet Houston
Posts: 28,829
Mentioned: 0 Post(s)
Quoted: 8 Post(s)
(Thread Starter)
RE: Did Cheney forge the "Niger" document?

The low grade uranium noted in the propaganda article above, was under control of the UN, a fact the article above fails to mention at key points in its' assertions, and through this omission attempts to give the reader the erroneous impression that the stockpile was being actively used by Saddam or his people. As usual, it is more sack of shit lies. If you want the truth, try reading an unbiased report like this one at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/tuwaitha.htm. It will confirm what people who value truth instead of lies now know: that Iraq was a punching bag for the US Air Force starting in 1991, that in 2003 it was not a threat to the United States, and that the current US Administration run by the Bush/Cheney Mob actively tried to hide these facts from the American people, as it presented a steady streams of lies, much like the article posted by gauge continues to do. For inside info on how this was accomplished, I recommend to those readers who do not get their opinions inserted into their skulls via their anuses over at Newsmax to read this book:

http://www.nationbooks.org/book.mhtml?t=ritter

Here is the article at Global Policy. One highlighted paragraph seems to directly conflict with the assertions in the newsmax article, which claims weapons grade plutonium existed in Iraq in 2003, and claims "500 tons of uranium ore" existed under Saddam's control. Lies, lies, and more lies from the supporter of an administration run by murderers and perjurers. But then, what did you expect?:

Tuwaitha
Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center
al-Aseel / al-Diyalla Facility
The Iraqi nuclear weapons effort, which was directed from the PC-3 headquarters received raw uranium for processing from mines at Ukashat. Seven facilities were promiment in the calutron enrichment program. Four of these facilities, al-Jesira, al-Atheer and al-Rabbiyah and al-Dijjla at Zafaraniyah, had not been identified by American intelligence as being associated with the nuclear weapons program and consequently escaped any significant damage from coalition airstrikes during the Gulf War. The three other facilities -- Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, and al-Fajar -- were previoiusly identified by American intelligence as being associated with the nuclear weapons program and suffered extensive damage during the War. Baghdad was operating approximately 25 calutron units; 20 at Tarmiya where uranium was enriched to 35%, and 5 at Tuwaitha where enrichment levels of approximately 95% were achieved. Another program for the production of uranium under the Petrochemical-3 project used gas centrifuge enrichment, with two facilities at Al Furat and Rashidiya, and a third under construction at Taji.

As of 2002, the only known store of nuclear material in Iraq is in heavyweight sealed barrels at the Tawaitha research facility south of Baghdad. It consists of several tons of low-grade uranium and is monitored by an international agency with the full co-operation of the Iraqi regime.

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located 18 km SSE of Baghdad, was the main site for Iraqi nuclear program. Tuwaitha is the location of the Osiraq reactor bombed by Israel in 1981. The Al Asil General Establishment at Al Tuweitha was the headquarters of the Iraqi Nuclear Commission. Activities included several research reactors, plutonium separation and waste processing, uranium metallurgy, neutron initiator development and work on number of methods of uranium enrichment. The Pure Lead Project at Al Tuweitha was engaged in the development of shielding for the nuclear weapons program.

At a location immediately outside Tuwaitha parts for the enrichment program were reportedly stored. Also outside Tuwaitha is a facility where magnetic coils and insulators were manufactured. Neither of these facilities were bombed during the Gulf War. Facility 416, the storage and warehouse area at Tuwaitha, was not at all damaged during the Gulf War. Facility 405 at Tuwaitha, operated by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and the basis for the 411 Program ( the al-Tarmiya enrichment facility), was probably totally destroyed. [GulfLINK]

Experiments on enrichment were conducted in the Laboratory Workshop Building (LWB). Operations in this building focused on the enrichment of uranium work included experiments with centrifuge, electromagnetic separator, and laser separation experiments. Also in this building was a group working on chemical processes using acetone. The "hot laboratories" were located in the lama building. [GulfLINK]

All nuclear fuel at this site was removed under IAEA monitoring. Equipment directly tied to the nuclear weapons program was destroyed in place.

In April 1991, Iraq’s inventory of safeguarded highly enriched uranium included 35.58 kilograms of U235 which had been irradiated but could not be readily used in weapons production since the fissile material would have been difficult to extract quickly from the irradiated fuel. This material was held at two storage locations: a fuel pond, which contained the reactor core and fuel storage racks; and an emergency storage where fueld from the Tammuz-2 reactor core and associated pond had been transferred during the Gulf War. This emergency storage, designated "location B", consisted of pits in a farmland area a few miles from the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center. [IAEA April 1992 ]

During the Gulf War the allied forces bombing of Iraqi facilities inflicted a maximum of 20 percent damage on the Iraqi nuclear weapons development program. Most of the damage occurred in two facilities--the headquarters (HQ) of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, called the Tuwaitha or al-Diyalla facility, located on the southeastern edge of Baghdad, and the al-Safaa uranium enrichment factory located north of Baghdad. Allied forces bombing inflicted a great amount of damage on Tuwaitha; however, most of the facilities destroyed belonged to the Iraqi Nuclear Power Commission or were administrative facilities. The reactor building and a small test reactor, which remained from the time that Osirak was built both were destroyed. One production unit was damaged. This unit processed spent nuclear fuel and contained two hot cells for this purpose. Bombing of this unit caused some nuclear contamination. Because of the contamination, Tuwaitha was closed for two days after the bombing. The nuclear reactor building was damaged. The reactor inside the building was shut down before the gulf war. [GulfLINK]

The Al Tuwaitha nuclear center was extensively equipped with "hot cells" for dealing with radioactive material, although many were severely damaged during bombing. However, concern remained about possible reconstruction and future use of the undamaged cells. Therefore, during the seventh inspection, these cells were rendered harmless by cutting off the manipulator arms and control wires. Associated glove boxes were rendered useless by pouring cement into them. As a long-term measure, epoxy resin was used along with cement to render harmless the mixers-settlers. The seventh and eighth IAEA inspections revealed special equipment essential to the nuclear weaponization programme for warhead development and assembly as distinct from nuclear material production. Two special video cameras ("streak cameras") were removed from Iraq and other equipment was sealed pending decisions on removal, destruction or monitoring. [IAEA April 1992 ]

Following the 1991 Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency removed all known Iraqi stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 687. As of 2002 the only positively confirmed nuclear material left in Iraq is 1.8 tons of low-enriched uranium and several tons of natural and depleted uranium. The material is in a locked storage site at the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility near Baghdad. Under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this stock of material is checked once a year by an IAEA team. The most recent check was in January 2002, and none of the material had been tampered with at that time.


A significant event marking the return to normalcy for the Iraqi people occurred 07 October 2003. Authority of a site was transferred back to the people of Iraq. Coalition forces transferred authority of the former Al Thawath Nuclear Research facility to the Iraqi Ministerial Guard. The Ministerial Guard will oversee the security and integrity of the facility. Two formations, one comprised of the Iraqi Ministerial Guard and the other of soldiers from Company B, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, marched from opposite ends of the ceremony area toward each other and came to a stop five feet before they would have met. Guest speaker, Dr. Rashad Omar, the Iraqi minister of science and technology, said the day was monu-mental. "Today marks the first change-of-command ceremony between Iraqis and the coalition," he said. "This place was a place of much concern and controversy. We will use it for new and better circum-stances." The prior regime used the Al Thawath Nuclear Research Facility as a weapons research and development site. "The Americans did well to give back this facility to the Iraqi people," said Hady Bouhy, one of the 412 guards assigned to the 23,000-acre complex. "It shows great progress."

By June 2004 Iraqi authorities had begun rebuilding facilities at the Tuwaitha research center once used by Saddam Hussein to pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions. The reconstruction under way at Tuwaitha, despite its potential for generating controversy, was no secret. The effort involved cleaning out, repairing, painting, and refurnishing office and laboratory buildings at the site. The intention is to create space to house research and development efforts by Iraq's newly reconstituted Ministry of Science and Technology. Those research efforts will focus on agriculture, water, petrochemical and other projects. The cost of reconstruction was estimated at about 30-million dollars. The Coalition Provisional Authority is not financing the rebuilding.It is being paid for by the Development Fund for Iraq, established by the United Nations. The United States has been a major donor to the fund and it is managed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. While it is unclear whether Iraqi scientists will be able to conduct nuclear research at Tuwaitha again, there has been radioactive contamination at the site and radioactive materials once stored there are missing.





Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

-President Barack Obama, 1st Inaugural address
FeelTheLove is offline  
Sponsored Links
Advertisement
 
Reply

  Mercedes-Benz Forum > General Mercedes-Benz Forums > Off-Topic

Quick Reply
Message:
Options

Register Now



In order to be able to post messages on the Mercedes-Benz Forum forums, you must first register.
Please enter your desired user name, your email address and other required details in the form below.

User Name:
Password
Please enter a password for your user account. Note that passwords are case-sensitive.

Password:


Confirm Password:
Email Address
Please enter a valid email address for yourself.

Email Address:
OR

Log-in











  • Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)
     
    Thread Tools
    Show Printable Version Show Printable Version
    Email this Page Email this Page
    Display Modes
    Linear Mode Linear Mode



    Posting Rules  
    You may post new threads
    You may post replies
    You may not post attachments
    You may not edit your posts

    BB code is On
    Smilies are On
    [IMG] code is On
    HTML code is Off
    Trackbacks are On
    Pingbacks are On
    Refbacks are On

     

    Title goes here

    close
    video goes here
    description goes here. Read Full Story
    For the best viewing experience please update your browser to Google Chrome